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Abstract
The development of technology gives opportunity to reach information in a reasonably
short amount of time. Ease of access to information does not only create positive
consequences, but also provides an easy way to access to information by unauthorized
parties. As a result, the requirement of protecting data from different aspects of security
turns into a significant issue of the information systems. Another issue in such systems is
safeguarding the access permissions in order not to allow public accesses to private data.
Protecting the data from disclosure, tempering or destruction as well as prevention
of unauthorized use of any resource are important aspects of the security in medical
environments since the medical data is private data.
In this thesis, we introduce a novel access control mechanism in order to safeguard
privacy of medical data of patients in dynamic environments. Our access control model,
called MAR-BAC (Medically Adaptive Role Based Access Control), takes advantages
from role-based access control (RBAC) and criticality-aware access control (CAAC).
Our original approach allows the medical professionals with different roles to be granted
access to medical records of patients automatically and without explicit request in case
of a medical emergency. In this context, we design secure and privacy aware protocols
from initial login to patients’ medical data transmission and retrieval by the medical
professionals. We mostly take a formal approach in our access control model definitions
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and procedures. The medical awareness feature of our MAR-BAC model comes from
the fact that medical data of the patients are analysed in near real-time. Each such
analysis yields automatic updates in the access control rules for the sake of urgent
medical attention. We carry out simulation based performance evaluation to determine
the delay characteristics of our MAR-BAC model. We also analyse the scalability of
the system. Our results show that MAR-BAC scales linearly under moderate system
load. Again under moderate load and in a hospital with 500 inpatients, the maximum
end-to-end delay to react a medical emergency is less than 12 seconds.
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Tıbbi S¸artlara Uyum Sag˘layabilen Rol Tabanlı Eris¸im Denetimi
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O¨zet
Teknolojinin gelis¸imi, bizlere bilgiye oldukc¸a kısa bir su¨rede ulas¸ma s¸ansı vermek-
tedir. Bilgiye ulas¸manın kolaylıg˘ı sadece pozitif sonuc¸lar yaratmamakta, aynı zamanda
yetkisi olmayan kis¸ilerin bilgiyi ele gec¸irmesini kolaylas¸tırmaktadır. Bunun bir sonucu
olarak, veriyi farklı gu¨venlik ac¸ılarından korumanın gereklilig˘i, bilgi sistemlerinin o¨nemli
bir sorunu haline gelmis¸tir. Bu sistemlerdeki bir bas¸ka husus ise o¨zel bilgilerin herkes
tarafından eris¸ilmesini engellemek adına eris¸im izinlerini korumaktır. Tıbbi veri de o¨zel
bilgi kapsamında oldug˘undan o¨tu¨ru¨, verinin yetkisiz kullanımını engellemenin yanısıra,
veriyi ac¸ıg˘a c¸ıkmaktan, deg˘is¸tirilmekten ve tahribattan korumak da tıbbi ortamlardaki
bilgi gu¨venlig˘inin o¨nemli gereksinimlerindendir.
Bu tezde, deg˘is¸ken ortamlardaki hastaların tıbbi verilerini korumak amacıyla yeni
bir eris¸im denetimi mekanizması o¨nerilmis¸tir. Eris¸im denetimi modelimiz MAR-BAC
(Tıbbi S¸artlara Uyum Sag˘layabilen Rol Tabanlı Eris¸im Denetimi), rol tabanlı eris¸im
denetimi (RBAC) ve kritik durumun farkında olan eris¸im denetimi (CAAC) mod-
ellerinin avantajlarını kullanmaktadır. O¨zgu¨n yaklas¸ımımız, acil vakalarda, deg˘is¸ik
rollerdeki tıbbi uzmanların tıbbi hasta kayıtlarına ac¸ık bir istek olmaksızın otomatik
olarak eris¸im kazanmasına imkan sag˘lamaktadır. Bu kapsamda, bas¸langıc¸ta oturum
ac¸maktan, hastaların tıbbi verilerinin iletimine ve tıbbi uzmanlar tarafından eris¸imlerine
kadar gu¨venli ve gizlilik bilinc¸li protokoller tasarladık. Eris¸im denetimi model tanım-
larımızda ve yo¨ntemlerimizde c¸og˘unlukla bic¸emsel bir yo¨ntem izledik. MAR-BAC mod-
elimizin tıbbi farkındalık o¨zellig˘i, hastaların tıbbi verilerinin yaklas¸ık gerc¸ek zamanlı
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olarak analiz edildig˘inden gelmektedir. Bu analizlerin her biri, acil tıbbi mu¨dahale
adına, eris¸im denetim kurallarının otomatik olarak gu¨ncellenmesiyle sonuc¸lanmaktadır.
MAR-BAC modelimizin gecikme karakteristiklerini belirlemek ic¸in simu¨lasyon tabanlı
performans deg˘erlendirmesi uygulanmıs¸tır. Aynı zamanda sistemin o¨lc¸eklenebilirlig˘i de
analiz edilmis¸tir. Sonuc¸larımız MAR-BAC sisteminin ortalama sistem yu¨ku¨ altında
lineer bir s¸ekilde o¨lc¸eklendig˘ini go¨stermektedir. 500 adet yatan hastaya sahip bir has-
tanede ve ortalama yu¨k altında, tıbbi bir aciliyete, uc¸tan uca tepki verme su¨resi 12
saniyeden daha azdır.
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1 Introduction
Access control has been an important security service since certain resources are not
open for public usage. In a cyber environment, those resources should be reachable by
a limited number of subjects and those subjects must be explicitly defined within the
system. In information management, subjects should only be able to access to allowed
resources; the others’ resources should not be accessed.
With increases in the growth of wireless networks, mobile devices and other tech-
nologies involved in remote access to resources, management of the access becomes more
important. This is due to rapid increase of the number of objects and the number of
subjects defined within the system. Therefore, access control systems should not only
perform correctly but should also work efficiently in order to operate with an adequate
response time. Moreover, if the information is considered to be sensitive, then it re-
quires to be managed with a secure model that should not leak any information to the
foreign parties.
Role based access control (RBAC) is an important model of access control paradigm.
The RBAC model introduces a mapping between roles and permissions instead of identi-
ties and permissions. The main advantage of this model is less administrative overhead
as compared to the traditional access control models.
In a medical environment, utilising RBAC could be useful for retrieving information
and granting access rights. However, pure RBAC could not assist medical experts in
emergency conditions. Consider a scenario that a medical sensor is retrieving informa-
tion from a patient’s body and sends this data to hospital server. If this information
is retrieved whenever the subjects’ request, then the system might miss some emer-
gency conditions that happen at unrequested times. Such RBAC based systems take
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the security as the main concern, but become unaware of medical conditions and emer-
gencies. However, a medically aware system should not only control the accesses of
the information, it also needs to be aware of medical condition of patients, especially
in emergencies. Under emergency conditions, the system should be able to respond at
real time according to the situation in order not to affect negatively patient’s health
condition. To address these issues, the system should also analyse and interpret the
medical information and adapt access rights accordingly.
1.1 Our contribution in a nutshell
In this thesis, we propose MAR-BAC, Medically Adaptive Role Based Access Con-
trol mechanism for healthcare management. In our model, patient’s medical data is
going to be interpreted and analysed in real-time. The purpose of this analysis is to be
aware of patients’ medical condition. Under emergency conditions, the system should
trigger an alarm in order to take responsive actions with the assistance of the analysis.
As a result of this analysis, if a critical condition has to be responded by a medical
expert, access control policies will dynamically change the access rights on the patient’s
medical data. Medical experts, who are specialized with the particular disease or com-
plications, are going to be selected and notified about patient’s emergency condition.
Hence, dynamic changes about access rights of patient’s medical data is performed ac-
cording to the emergency conditions. Once the emergency condition passes over, access
rights are restored to the original state.
Our MAR-BAC model is able to transmit the sensed medical record of a patient.
The transmission of the data is secured with the establishment of a secure channel.
Moreover, our model gives the opportunity to access the medical information under the
regulation of access control policies. Under emergency conditions, it provides dynamical
changes in access rights of medical experts in order to recover patient’s health condition.
It does not only dynamically change access rights of the medical experts, but also notifies
those personnel for the sake of fast response to the condition.
We performed simulation-based performance analysis of our MAR-BAC system us-
ing different metrics and parameters. Performance results show that our system causes
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reasonable end-to-end delay, although it varies with the number of subjects. Moreover,
the delay introduced by security and privacy related processing is much less than the
other delay components.
1.2 Outline of thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Section 2 will give the background
information. Related work and problem statement can be found in Section 3. The
proposed access control model definition and its protocols are explained in Section 4.
Performance evaluation is detailed in Section 5. Finally, the thesis is concluded in
Section 6.
3
2 Background Work
Firstly, this section briefly discusses access control models in historical perspective.
Subsequently, privacy and diagnosis of the medical data is also mentioned in this section.
After the importance of privacy is stated, the security mechanisms which are used in
this work are shortly explained.
2.1 Access Control
Today’s information management systems should protect resources against unautho-
rized disclosure (secrecy) and unauthorized or improper modifications (integrity), while
at the same time ensuring their availability to legitimate users (resistant to denial-of-
service) [3]. This is a significant requirement because any leakage of information about
an organization’s consumers, strategic plans or products to a competitor may result
in financial, reputation losses and legal liability [4]. Therefore, access rights defined
on resourced should be controlled in order to authorize acces only to legitimate users.
This process is termed access control. Decision taken for an access request is generally
needed to be predefined. This predefined decision rules implements regulations are so
called security policy of the access control. Permission (or privilege) is authorization
to perform an action on the system [5]. Subjects are able to access objects according
to the permissions defined within the access control system.
Two important definitions related to this concept are objects and subjects. An object
is the smallest accessible resource on a computer system [5]. Objects can be any data
or services which are accessible to predefined subjects. The subjects, which are able to
access objects, are selected according to the regulations defined in the security policy.
The term user is used for the people who are eligible to access certain resources on
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a access control model. However, user and subject does not mean same entity in this
concept. More precisely, users are subset of subjects. In other words, a user is a subject
but not visa versa. Subjects can also be processes in a computer. A user could have
multiple subjects in operation. Consider the example a user in an operating system
would like to read a certain file. While reading the file, (s)he may also would like to
modify another file as well. Therefore, each of user’s read and write requests are referred
to a different processes, namely distinct subjects.
In the following subsections, some of the important access control models are ex-
plained.
2.1.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary access control (DAC) [6–9] refers to access that allows users to alter
the features of the object as well as to specify whether the object is accessible to other
users. Access control is maintained via the following way. One or more users can control
the decision of the access to certain object. Those users are generally the owners of
the object or decision making is delegated from creator of the object. The controllers
decide about access rights on the object so that which subjects are able or not allowed
to access the resource. This mechanism is called DAC model and it is also called an
identity based access control (IBAC) [10]. As a result, control over accesses depends
on the identity of the requester and access control policy states what the requester is
allowed to do.
General implementation of DAC model is based on the users, who generate the
resources or creators of the objects, establish the rules over the objects. In other words,
the users, who own the resources, are able to grant privileges to other users defined
within the system. Users can also revoke the permissions from accesses originated from
other subjects [3]. Therefore, privileges can be utilized in a two-way manner. It can be
granting access to or rejecting access from other subjects.
Access matrix model is the early step of the DAC. It is first proposed by Lamp-
son [11] for operating systems file system management. Access matrix model states are
defined with subject, object and access matrix. Matrix rows are defined as subjects
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and columns are referred to the objects. In Figure 1, it can be seen a single entry in
the matrix corresponded to permissions given to subject (which is defined in row) over
resource (which is defined in column).
Figure 1: Access Matrix Model
However, this matrix is going to have too many entries if access control should be
maintained for a large number of subjects. Generally, the matrix end up as sparse.
Sparse means that, most of its cells are empty. Therefore, it will consume lots of space.
Figure 2 gives three different practical model in order to solve the problems of access
matrix model.
Authorization Table Each entry in the table consists of subject, action and object.
It defines which subject is able to perform which action over an object.
Access Control Lists Each object has a list of subjects who are able perform an
action over that object. List nodes contains both subject information and also which
actions are able to performed by the subject.
Capability Each subject has a list of objects. In each list element, object and
actions able to be performed by the subject is defined.
In the authorization table model, it is hard to find whether given subject, action,
object tuple exists within the table or not. It is the same as finding an element defined
in a linked-list [12]. Access control lists take advantage from finding access regulations
defined over objects. On the other hand, in those lists, it is not easy to find access
policies defined over subjects. One needs to iterate over each rule defined in access
control list in order to find all rules defined over subjects. Capabilities distinguishes
the problem of finding all access rules defined on a single subject because it basically
maintains lists which are mapped over subjects. However, this time finding all access
rules over a single object requires to iterate over each rule within the capabilities. In
a capability based system it is mentioned that system is vulnerable to forgery (unau-
6
(a) Authorization Table (b) Access Control Lists (c) Capabilities
Figure 2: Improvements over Access Matrix Model
thorized usage of access rights) [3]. If user acquire its capabilities over a system, it
can crate a copy of the capabilities and maliciously give those to a third party. Since
the third party has the capabilities for given system, it can request access as defined
in the capabilities from the system. Another problem for capabilities is revocation of
capabilities which are already released from the system. If a user is gets its capability
list from the system, revocation does not directly modify the capabilities taken by the
user.
2.1.2 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Mandatory Access Control or MAC security model is one of the oldest access control
mechanisms. Main objective of this model is to protect system resources against inap-
propriate or undesired user access [13]. It restricts access to objects which are requested
by subjects. The entities or subjects, which require to access certain objects such as
data files, devices, systems, etc., must be given access rights explicitly [14]. As a result
of this requirement, the access is centrally controlled by security policy administrator
or system administrator. System administrator specifies which entities in the subjects
set are able to reach resources on an individual basis. The model was formalized with
the requirement of restricting individual resource owners have to be granted or denied
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access to resource objects in file systems. The records which subjects are able to access
specific objects are stored in access matrix [15]. The security policy defines which type
of accesses are going to be granted for each entity [16].
The subjects are restricted with the security policy which is controlled by system
administrator. This means even a subject, which is the owner of a specific object,
has limited access over the object. An analogy for this can be a multilevel system
for military or governmental documents and files. Some of the files must be restricted
with limited access. The restriction may be the number of entities which request to
access the data, meaning that certain subjects are able to see contents of data. Another
limitation is, even subjects have right to access data, they may not be able to see data
as a whole so that they can only read file or can read some part of the file.
There is a branch of mandatory access control called the Bell-LaPadula. This model
basically focuses on the confidentiality of the objects. It utilise access classes which are
assigned each object and subject. The classes are defined with a dominance relationship.
An access class c1 dominates access class c2 if and only if security level of c1 is greater
or equal to c2. In order to achieve the confidentiality, two principles formulated by Bell
and LaPadula [17] must be satisfied:
No-read-up A subject is allowed a read access to an object only if the access class
of the subject dominates the access class of the object.
No-write-down A subject is allowed a write access to an object only if the access
class of the subject is dominated by the access class of the object.
These principles ensures that objects cannot be reached by lower level access classes
in order to perform a read operation and also objects cannot be modified by subjects
which are in higher security level. If a user would like to modify a file which is in a
lower class, then (s)he has to connect to the system with a level below its security level
of access class [3].
Another important branch of MAC mechanisms is the integrity of the information.
Although the confidentiality of the objects could be satisfied with the model above,
it does not safeguard that integrity of the resources. For instance, subjects of a low
level access class are able to indirectly modify the content of the higher level objects
8
which threatens the integrity of the resource. As a result, another model for MAC is
introduced for this purpose. Biba [18] has come up with the idea for ensuring integrity
is maintained. In the Biba model, subjects are not able to change the content of the
objects in a non-straightforward way or improper information flows. This model also
requires two principles to be satisfied in order to provide integrity:
No-read-down A subject is allowed a read access to an object only if the access
class of the object dominates the access class of the subject.
No-write-up A subject is allowed a write access to an object only if the access
class of the subject dominates the access class of the object.
By applying these principles, undesired subject access which may cause violation of
the integrity of the object is prevented. The principles of Biba model maintains integrity
for indirect modification threat whereas integrity itself is much broader concept and
additional precautions should be considered [3].
As it can be intuitively figured out so that both models, grants subjects to access to
certain direction and the direction is reversed in both models. Therefore, to obtain both
confidentiality and integrity as a whole, Bell-LaPadula and Biba models both should be
applied to the system. The outcome of the combination of both models is that subject
is able to read or write only the objects which are at the same security level as the
subject itself [19]. Even though mandatory access control protects indirect information
leakages, it is not give the assurance of complete secrecy of the information [3].
2.1.3 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
Role Based Access Control introduced with the advancements of multi-user and
multi-application on-line systems in 1970s [20]. The motivation behind RBAC is sim-
plifying the access control mechanism while maintaining the security policy administra-
tion and having flexible access control policies. In this model, system administrators are
predefining which roles are able to act according to access policy decisions. Permission
determines the actions which can be done when a particular service is requested. Once
role-permissions mapping is defined, users assigned abstract attributes “roles” [21]. As
a result of this predefined process, it is simple to assign users to roles instead of assign-
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ing each user to privileges. RBAC models have evolved so that they are now considered
as generalized version of access control. RBAC is general enough to implement both
MAC and DAC [20]. On the other hand, RBAC achieves this implementation with less
overhead compared to DAC and MAC models. According to Ferralio et al. [22], if U
is the number of users and P is the number of permissions in an access control mech-
anism; the number of administrative operations is proportional to U × P in identity
based authorization and it is proportional to U + P in RBAC assuming the number
of roles is constant. The meaning of this is that; if any set of permissions has to be
changed for a given role, then only permission-role mapping is going to be modified
instead of changing each user permission.
In a project, which is held in the National Institute of Standard and Technology
(NIST), it is claimed that RBAC addresses the commercial and governmental require-
ments such as: user confidence, privacy of personal information, hampering of unau-
thorized distribution of financial assets [23]. Organizations tend to have access control
over users in a centralized fashion, but while maintaining this central approach, they
do not want anyone to be able to abuse privileges to any user [20]. Therefore, assign-
ing users to roles rather than the privileges themselves, gives the opportunity to give
users predefined set of access over required actions. Eventually, it generates abstract
permissions that controls the access rights for a given entity [16]. That is to say, it
enables systems to work with abstract data. In addition, it supports for the Principle
of Least Privilege [24]. The principle ensures that an entity is only given the permis-
sions to complete a specific operation. As a result, entity has the minimum number of
permissions in order to achieve necessary access grant. This principle prevents users
to perform unnecessary and potentially harmful action which is a contribution to side
effect of granting access to those operations [5].
It is also possible to have a hierarchical ordering between roles. The ordering can be
achieved with the introduction of partial order between roles [25]. This order gives ease
of assignment of permissions in a well defined fashion. Senior roles may encapsulate
junior roles in terms of permissions. With the help of hierarchical rationale, users who
share the same level of role can be assigned into a single role abstraction. In other
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words, it can classify permissions of roles and enables multiple hierarchies to classify
partial order between entities. At the top of the hierarchy, administrators can give
partial inheritance between roles under favour of partial order [26]. Figure 3, shows the
aforementioned architecture of RBAC.
Figure 3: RBAC architecture.
2.1.4 Context-Aware Access Control (CAAC)
Context-aware access control is an extension to RBAC model. It implements the
RBAC properties with additional context-based security policies. The definition of con-
text is varied in literature [27,28]. In general, it refers to the characterization of physical
world situations that are relevant for performing appropriate actions in the comput-
ing domain [29]. Contextual information of a subject may be location, the time for
access request, computing capabilities, devices being used and such physically related
conditions. The requirement for this model comes from the complexity of distributed,
heterogeneous domains [30]. The context directly affects the level of trust associated
with a user and as a result access is granted or denied for request. The addition of
context awareness provides dynamicity for the management of accesses. The trust level
shifts according to the context information of the subject.
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A generalized version of RBAC (GRBAC) is defined by Covington et al. in order
to utilize access control over private information and resources in a ubiquitous com-
puting environment [31]. Environmental roles are included in this model additional to
traditional RBAC. Objects are assigned to those environmental roles according to the
security policy. The access to the objects are granted if subject satisfies both traditional
role conditions and environmental role conditions.
In another model, proposed by Chakraborthy et al., subject can activate a per-
mission and access data in relation to the level of trust has been obtained from the
system [21]. The level of trust is calculated for each subject with the help of role and
context information. The context information is based on behaviour, knowledge and
recommendations by other subjects.
Context information can be also an emergency condition according to the work for
criticality-aware access control model [32]. In the work, rather than direct context
changes of subjects, the changes of physical environment itself is considered as context.
Their claim is traditional CAAC models are reactive and depend on observe/evaluate
over the system for explicit access requests. However, those actions does not take into
account for emergency conditions. Their work is proactive according to the emergency
condition. The condition may be a tornado warning which should automatically tell
smart home application in order to unlock doors.
2.2 Privacy of Medical Data and Diagnosis
Privacy has become an significant part of the digital world. Its importance comes
from the information it contains. Private data (such as age, birth place etc...) does
not seem to have valuable information at all. However, such information may cause
unwanted consequences if they are known to third parties. Consider the scenario that
an insurance company is going sell health insurance to a person. If the company knows
the person had heart attacks in previous years, then the company may exclude the
heart diseases from the insurance contract for that particular person. Consequently,
insurance companies would start to make contracts according to the health conditions
of the people. As a result, companies would tremendously reduce the risk of giving
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money to their customers as sudden changes of health condition of customers. That is
why people are not and should not be willing to share their private data.
Medical data is a private data of an individual therefore, in this section private
information is going to be explained in detail. Also since medical data of individuals
are concerned, important medical aspects are also going to be described.
2.2.1 Private Information
The concept of privacy is hard to define. Although it is easy to explain privacy
violations, preferences, characteristics and functions, defining the privacy is because its
meaning is contingent on culture, situation and personal preferences [33]. One of the
famous definition for privacy is defined by Altman [34] : “selective control of access
to the self or to one’s group”. It illustrates private information should not be open to
anyone but the predefined set of subjects are able reach the data.
Privacy in medical environment is encapsulated as a multi-dimensional establish-
ment which consists of three independent dimensions: informational, physical and psy-
chological [35]. The first dimension is about the degree of the control over personal
information. Physical dimension controls the degree of inaccessibility to others. And
the last dimension is the degree of doctor’s respect about patient’s cultural beliefs in-
ner thoughts, religious choices. Information security mostly concerns about the first
dimension as well as the second dimension. Informational privacy is based on person’s
own decisions over their private data. Individuals would like to have control over their
information in a way to determine how, when, where and to what extent the data is
going to be shared with another entity. Information security and access control are
mainly built on informational privacy. Because it includes avoiding unwanted actions
from other entities namely, maintaining unauthorized disclosure from third parties. In-
formation leakage related to patients’ health records have caused several reports such
as hospital workers were fired because they reviewed it without patient’s permission,
information related to cancer treatment has shared with National Inquirer caused hos-
pital employees are warned, suspended their work or fired due to the sharing without
permission [36].
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In pervasive healthcare services maintaining mobility, portability, access authoriza-
tion, privacy and security is the most important challenge [37]. Through context aware-
ness, a healthcare system can use the context information of the subject to perform
tasks according to the predefined physical space. Also the more information flowed to
the healthcare system, it can better adapt to serve the user. Paradoxically, the more
system knows about the user, it generate a greater threat to the user’s privacy [38].
Therefore, maintaining a balance over access authorization and privacy becomes a cru-
cial aspect of a system where private information flow is integrated.
As an example of the challenge, Chan and Perrig [39] worked on the privacy and
security over sensor networks. In the work, sensed data through sensors are private
data of a patient. They claimed that without ensuring the protection of the privacy
of information, it should not be deployed such technology because it will cause more
damage than it would otherwise help people.
O’neil at al. [40] worked on personal information security. They investigated com-
mercial framework case studies for electronic commerce system. They come up the use
of private information could be put on a beneficial use. On the other hand, it often
results in personal information being unwillingly used, sold or otherwise disseminated,
and may considered as a form of invasion of customer’s privacy. One of the solutions
they proposed to overcome the problem is adding anonymity between consumers and
institutions. Another solution is the separation of the data over different databases. It
can also be illustrated as keeping eggs in different baskets.
In another work [37], balancing usability and privacy while developing security is
concerned. Their claim was deployments of pervasive solutions in medicine come up
with legal and ethical complications and inappropriate disclosure of medical records
involves real and substantial liabilities. Therefore, developing privacy based security
systems requires careful considerations of how to comply with legal regulations’ privacy
and security titles.
All in all, privacy conservation is an important issue in all applications. Develop-
ments related with private data should be applied with consideration of issues related
with legal regulations. Without taking into account, the consequences of private data
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leakage would result in unwanted liabilities.
2.2.2 Vital Signs
Generating diagnoses for a certain illness is an iterative process. This process in-
cludes information gathering and hypothesis generation. Data acquisition requires phys-
ical examination. This data is crucial for the diagnosis and treatment of the disease.
However, each data unit has a potential to change the way of treatment. Diagnostic
tests are applied during this data gathering phase. Finding a treatment according to
the physiological signs, relevant situations are considered and clinical expert should
understand properties of reliability and accuracy as well as the appropriate likelihood
ratios. Thus physical examination plays an important role in generating hypothesis
about the illness and according to the hypothesis, the treatment which going to be
applied is going to be determined.
In the light of this requirement of physical observation, vital signs are the most
common examination parameters those are often observed to detect first clues about
the disease. There are five vital signs which are considered to be examined first: (i)
body temperature, (ii) heart rate (pulse), (iii) respiration, (iv) oxygen saturation and
(v) blood pressure [41].
Primal Vital Signs:
Body Temperature is the level of heat produced and sustained by body processes.
Variations and changes in body temperature are indicators for possible diseases or other
abnormal activities of human body [42]. This sign is important since it affects biological
activities of the human body directly. The temperature should be in optimal values
for reactions taking place in cells. If temperature becomes higher or lower than the
optimal value, actions, which are performed in human body, are going to take more
time to complete. If the vital actions are done slower, it would endanger the body due
to this slow activity.
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Heart Rate or Pulse is the frequency with which the heart beats, calculated by
counting the number of QRS complexes per minute [42]. Pulse indicates the speed of
heart’s blood pumping speed. Therefore, higher pulse is a reflector that heart requires
to work more than the expected. The reason behind this overwork may give clues about
heart is having trouble with pumping functionality so it beats more or body requires
more blood circulation in order to operate functionally. Conversely, if the pulse is weak
it could also refer to a problem. The body requires to have a certain flow of blood
within the veins in order to continue its biological activities. If it becomes lower than
some certain level, it also would threat the life of the patient.
Respiration is the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide between atmosphere and
body cells [43]. Respiration is significant because it arranges the required external
energy resources by taking oxygen and emitting carbon dioxide. Since all biological
activities requires energy, respiration directly affects the amount of energy can be gen-
erated for body. Low respiration would result in lower energy generation for body.
Thus it is going to complete lesser number of vital actions for living. As a result pa-
tient’s health may go into a state which endangers its life. The opposite way may also
cause problems as well. Higher respirations brings about more heart rate per minute.
Therefore, it also can be dangerous for sustaining vital activities.
Oxygen saturation is the amount of oxygen bound to hemoglobin in the blood,
expressed as a percentage of the maximal binding capacity [44]. Human body needs
and regulates oxygen in order to generate energy for body activity. If the balance
of oxygen level does not exceed a certain level, than body lacks from the energy to
continue body functionality. Although this part is highly related with the respiration,
even breathing continues on normal levels, the density of the oxygen may be lower than
normal value. Therefore the body triggers frequent breathing to get more oxygen. As
it is stated before, lack of oxygen level could result in a dangerous condition. Therefore,
this vital information could be used for physical examination of a patient.
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Blood Pressure is the pressure of blood on the walls of any blood vessel. It consists
of two pressures. Diastolic blood pressure is minimum value of recorded blood pressure.
The highest value at which arterial system requires to operate is called systolic blood
pressure [45]. When blood pressure is high, it means heart is working harder. It puts
extra strain on arteries and heart itself. Over time arteries become thicker and less
flexible. This increases the risk of damaging end-organ [46].
As it is depicted, primal vital signs are important to generate a hypothesis about
diseases. The data collected from the patient can now put a light on the way of the
process understanding the main cause of the illness. Apart from those vitals, there is
another important sign that could help the medical personnel to generate hypothesis.
Electrocardiogram or ECG is a graphic record of the heart’s integrated action cur-
rents obtained with the electrocardiograph displayed as voltage changes over time [47].
In Figure 4, which is copied from [48], the waveforms which consist an ECG record
and their intervals can be observed. By monitoring ECG, medical experts would have
a clear understanding the causes of an illness. Analysis of ECG record is a crucial
element of diagnostics in deteriorating heart diseases [49]. In some cases, the record
gives detailed information about non-heart related diseases. This occurs the indirect
effects of a disease cause changes in ECG data.
Figure 4: ECG record: Important waveforms and intervals (copied from [48])
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2.3 Cryptographic Properties
Security in a computing environment is the protection of digital assets from unin-
tended or unauthorized access. The assets are varied from computer itself to digital
information which contain within computer. Security is an indispensable part of this
work because as it has been told in Section 2.2.1, the model is established for the pri-
vate data which is patient information. Therefore, constructing a model with network
security becomes mandatory.
2.3.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
Security has been in use from ancient civilizations. Before 20th century, security
concept has been constructed and applied with the symmetric cryptographic systems.
Symmetric key cryptography is basically based on a function which takes two parame-
ters one is cleartext and the other called as key. After the function operation cleartext
becomes ciphertext which does not directly give any information about the cleartext. In
order to retrieve cleartext from the ciphertext, general approach is decipher the cipher-
text with another function which operates reverse with respect to encryption function.
This inverse function takes ciphertext and key as input and produces decrypted infor-
mation which is expected to be cleartext itself. This whole method is called symmetric
key cryptography because same key has been used for two operations [50].
The most basic example for the symmetric cryptography schemes is Caeser’s shift
cipher. It’s a substitution cipher which replaces each letter in alphabet with another
letter. If the letters shifted by 1 to left, then all letters are going to be shifted left
by 1. Letter ’b’ becomes letter ’a’, letter ’a’ becomes letter ’z’ and so on. To decrypt
the encrypted text, applying reverse function as shift right by 1 letter is going to give
the cleartext as a result. Another example for the basics of symmetric key encryption
is the famous Exclusive or (xor). This is a logical operation that takes bitwise inputs
and return true (or 1) if and only if one input is different than the other. XOR is
manipulated as both encryption and decryption function. As a result with same key,
say 1, if we encrypt 0, we will have ciphertext as 1 and we apply the same operation to
decrypt ciphertext 1 to get the plaintext 0.
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IBM has conducted a project named LUCIFER which is led by Dr. Horst Feistel [51].
At the and of this research project, an encryption algorithm for data protection was
published. This algorithm is based on the feistel network which ensures that there
exists an inverse function. The algorithm later become a standard for symmetric key
encryption named as Data encryption standard (DES). It originally takes 64-bit key,
input and output. However, the implementation does not use all of the key namely
8-bit of the key does not used during encryption. Those bits are called as parity bits.
In short the algorithm utilizes 56-bit key. It was a strong algorithm during 1970s since
computing power was much more less than today’s.
56-bit key is considered as not secure once computing power increased during the
years. The first attempt not to change the standard but increase the security was the
invention of 3-DES. It increased key size from 56-bit to 168-bit if three different keys
are used. 3-DES can be also used with 2 different keys then it will have the security
level of 112-bit. 3 different DES keys are used to generate ciphertext. However, with
its vulnerability to meet-in-the-middle attack [52], efficient key-size becomes as same
as 2 different DES keys which is 112-bit.
112-bit efficient key-size become less secure due to the advancements of computing
power. A new standard is required to be established for data security. Vincent Rijmen
and Joan Daemen has won the competition which was organized by NIST [53]. Their
work on symmetric encryption become the standard for data encryption. It is approved
by National Security Agency (NSA). This cryptosystem can be used with three different
key sizes; 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit. The name of the encryption scheme is Rijndael
but it is generally known as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The attacks found
on AES system still require computational complexity which are close to exponent of the
key-size. Therefore, AES is still applicable for today’s computer security requirements.
There is a drawback with the use of symmetric key cryptography which is called
key distribution problem. As it is mentioned both encryption and decryption require
to have the same key in order to have a proper communication. But distribution and
management of those keys are problematic due to initial communication to agree upon
a key in a public network.
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2.3.2 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography (PKC) has been first introduced at 1970s by Withfield
Diffie and Martin E. Hellman [54]. They step in to the problem of key exchange and give
the notion of digital signatures. The cryptosystems based on public key cryptography
can be proven to be secure because they require computationally too much time to break
the system which is considered as infeasible. Public key cryptosystems are mainly
built on three of the big number theory subjects; Discrete Logarithm Problem [55],
Integer Factorization and Elliptic Curve Cryptography [56]. In PKC, function that
encrypts plaintext takes key parameter which is called as public key. On the other
hand, function which decrypts the ciphertext takes key parameter as private key. These
two keys are different from each other but they are not completely independent from
each. Since reason two functions use different keys, PKC is also termed asymmetric key
cryptography. Public key algorithms are less efficient with respect to symmetric ones
because they generally require more computing operations therefore they need more
time to complete computation. [50].
Diffie-Hellman protocol [54] was the first attempt to solve key exchange problem over
a public channel. Figure 5 describes the notion of the key exchange for two parties.
Basically two parties first agree on a multiplicative group of integer under modular of
a prime number and also select a generator of this group. Then, both entities chose
their secret number under this multiplicative group. Both parties send to other side the
exponent of the generator with the secret number under modulo of the agreed prime
number. The security comes from the discrete logarithm problem. It is computationally
infeasible to find secret from computation result of modular exponentiation for big
numbers. Even though protocol is a novel one, it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attack [57].
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman published the RSA [58] algorithm as another public
key cryptosystem. In this system, it is possible to do both encryption/decryption and
digital signatures. RSA is based on the integer factorization problem. Figure 6 gives
the computations of key establishment phase of RSA. One selects two big primes and
multiplies them to get a bigger composite number. This composite number is used
20
Figure 5: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
for both encryption/decryption and digital signature operations. Before doing crypto-
graphic operations, another calculation must be made. This is finding the number of
relatively prime integers which are less than or equal to composite number. Finding
those numbers also referred as calculating Euler’s phi function (Φ) [59]. As a final op-
eration, public and private values of RSA are determined such that both of them should
be relatively prime to the result of Euler’s phi function. Encryption and signature val-
idation is done with the help of public key. Public key is conceptionally is not trusted
by everyone but since it is public anyone can do encryption and signature validation
with the information. On the other hand, decryption and generating signature from a
plaintext is only available with private key. The private key should be the secret key
which is known solely by its owner therefore owner becomes the only entity which is
able to sign files and able to decrypt incoming messages which all operated with that
particular public key.
Figure 6: RSA Key Establishment
21
3 Related Work and Problem Statement
In this section, related work in the literature is discussed. Problem statement of
this work is also mentioned in this section.
3.1 Related Work
Today’s access control models mainly use RBAC principles in order to reduce the
number of control operations over a target subject. Zheng et al. [60] defines participa-
tion, act and activity in order to obtain a dynamic version of RBAC. Act is defined as
an operation of application systems and role is defined as a set of subjects sharing the
same access control policies to certain objects. Participation denotes a functional role
and co-works with act; it is a new abstraction between roles and acts. First, the role
of a subject that requests access is found within the system. Then according to that
role, subject is granted participation controlled by defined rules in access control policy.
If participation of a subject is mapped to requested act in activity cell, then access is
granted to subject.
A RBAC mechanism is also constructed for cyber-physical systems by Muppavarapu
and Chung [1]. They try to reduce the administration overhead, which stems from the
role privileges of the individuals by a middleware. They apply a protocol to gain access
control credentials and once those credentials are obtained, the protocol communicates
with the resource manager in order to perform the requested operation.
The abovementioned two studies [1, 60] do not address the criticality management
requirement of our proposed model.
Venkatasubramanian [2] claims that in a medical environment access control should
be adaptive, and therefore, dynamic for emergency management. This versatility pro-
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vides the required privileges to the subjects implicitly for short periods of time. With
the use of critical-aware access control, a model has been constructed, which behaves like
context based access control (CBAC) in normal state. In CBAC, context information
of the subject determines the access control. For instance, context can be constrained
by time and space. If a subject requests access in different places at the same time,
system rejects requests according to the policy of having a subject not to appear in
different places at the same time. Other than normal states, when someone experience
criticality, it shifts from this model to another, which is more proactive in nature.
Undoubtedly, the work proposed in [2] is closely related to our study since it supports
criticality management. However, it achieves the regulation of critical situations by
applying regular checks over the system in certain periods. Another drawback of [2] is
that it tries to automate the responsive actions over patients for a calculated amount
of time. This is a medical risk, because treatments cannot be applied to all patients in
the same way even if they suffer from the same disease. Therefore, we come up with
a model which interprets patients’ medical information whenever the data are received
by system. Under critical circumstances, system dynamically gives extra control to
medical professionals in order to recover the patients from their critical diseases.
3.2 Problem Statement
Access control has been an important topic where selective restriction is required
for certain resources. It is actually a process based on prevention of unauthorized use
of a resource [61]. Most of access control models rely on authorizing identity of the user
and directly inspects whether that user is eligible to have the requested information.
In a medical context, the information retrieval becomes more crucial due to the access
over data could affect response time of a emergency condition of a patient. Thus, access
control model should prevent unauthorized accesses and also it should respond to the
requests in a short period of time. Because of these reasons, we aim to bring three
important properties to access control over medical data. The first one is dynamical
change of access policies due to emergency conditions. The second one is the real-time
interpretation and analysis of medical data. As a third property, system gives subjects
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the opportunity of having more than one access right at a given time.
 Dynamical change of access policies: Under emergency conditions of a pa-
tient, the access to private data requires some flexibility for the sake of quicker
medical response. Moreover, saving patient from such emergency conditions may
rely on getting help from more than one medical expert. In order to receive
this help, those medical experts should observe the condition of the patient by
requesting access to his/her medical data. Consequently, system should dynami-
cally change access policies to deliver medical information to medical experts.
 Real-time interpretation and analysis of medical data: In pervasive health-
care systems, patient data is sensed and transmitted over a network to hospital
server. In this server, doctors are able to monitor the health conditions of the
patients. For the sake of understanding the medical condition of the patient, in-
terpretation and analysis of medical data are required. Moreover, it should be
considered if the patient is experiencing an emergency condition, then this should
trigger an alarming state. This is essential since doctors may not be aware of
the condition at the time criticality occurs. Also, the situation is often needed to
be responded promptly. Correspondingly, the interpretation and analysis of the
medical data are necessary to be done in real-time. It is going to directly affect
the health condition of the patient. In most of the cases, a timely intervention
increases the chance of prevention of deterioration and/or complications [62–64].
 Maintaining multiple access right at a given time: General approach in
access control systems is controlling whether requested access is a valid one with
respect to the defined rules. In RBAC, subjects have predefined roles over the
access control manager. Therefore, their capabilities are controlled by their roles.
In our system, system users are able to have more than one role to get multiple
access rights at a time. Consider a scenario that a medical expert also requires
to use our system as a patient. The scenario could be established in an opposite
way; a patient defined in the system may become a medical expert as well. If the
access rights are defined properly, the risk of giving permission to an unauthorised
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subject is eliminated. Moreover, system is able to give permission to subjects with
respect to their multiple role access requests at the same time.
As an outcome, the ultimate goal of this thesis is construction of an access control
model for medical information which also have dynamical properties as a response to
emergency conditions and able to interpret and analyse the medical data in real-time.
In the following sections, we explain our methods and protocols how to achieve this
goal. Moreover, we also provide simulation-based performance evaluation results.
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4 Proposed MAR-BAC (Medically Adaptive Role
Based Access Control) model for healthcare sys-
tems
Healthcare systems are used to generate and transmit medical records from the
source to a sink, which collects data from distinct subjects. During this transmission,
medical data is open to unauthorised accesses and modifications if the network is not
secured. Even in secure and private networks, the integrity of the data may not be
maintained because of the transmission errors. In healthcare management, public com-
munication channels are generally used. Therefore, it is going to be open for inner and
outer threats in terms of privacy and access permissions. To overcome such problems,
we propose an access control model which prohibits unauthorised actions by applying
additional security checks specifically for medical environments. Access control poli-
cies are dynamically adapted while ensuring the protection of the digital data. Since
we deal with medical records, we are able to analyse the medical data and interpret
the health condition of the user. This is important because the health status of the
patient may change in a negative way. There could be a situation which requires an
external help in order to recover from the problematic condition. Those conditions are
called critical conditions or criticalities. The anomalies found in the patient’s medical
record are recognised by the system automatically and the information is used to notify
medical personnel to cooperatively rescue the patient’s life. Our system utilises parts
of RBAC and CAAC models for the application of a healthcare system. It has been
constructed such that roles are valid in a certain period of time. Another benefit of
our system is that access control constraints and policies are defined according to the
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needs of the healthcare systems. As our system manages multiple users, actions should
be clearly defined for each role and user. In short, access control is required in order
to manage the operations in an order. In our work, an access control model has been
described which is composed of different phases. Before going into detail, the definition
of the identifiers which are used in this model are given in Table 1.
Table 1: List of identifiers used in MAR-BAC Mechanism
A Set of Administrators KServer Public Key of ATOS
ADPS Authorization and
Data Processing
Server
M Set of Medical Experts
ATOS Authentication and
Ticket Obtainment
Server
OTP One-Time Pad
APM Access Policy Man-
ager
P Set of Patients
C Set of Disease Cate-
gory
Pj Assigned set of pa-
tients to medical ex-
pert mj ∈M
CP Set of Control Policies PU(key, plain) Public key encryption
of plain using given
key
D Set of Diseases R Set of roles
Di,t Set of possible dis-
eases for patient pi at
time t
T Set of Time
E(key, plain) Symmetric key en-
cryption of plain using
given key
TicketIdADPS Ticket assigned to
server identifier
H Set of Health Informa-
tion
TS Time Stamp
IdADPS Identity of ADPS U Set of Users (subjects)
KAA Pre-shared key be-
tween ATOS and
ADPS
α Set of acts
KATOS Key which is only
known by ATOS
Γi Access request from
user ui ∈ U
KCS Shared Key between
Client and ADPS
pi Set of participations
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4.1 Set Definitions
In this subsection, set definitions, required constraints for access control model and
also control policies of the system are going to be explained. This work is an extension
of RBAC therefore the roles of the system are defined as follows.
As it is stated in Table 1, U is the set of users, A is the set of system administrators,
M is the set of medical experts and P is the set of patients. New roles can also be
added in case of need. Currently those three main roles are sufficient to configure the
system. Proposition 1 defines U is superset of specific user roles. In other words, set
of system administrators (A), set of medical experts (M) and set of patients (P ) are
subsets of the user set (U).
Proposition 1. A ⊆ U , M ⊆ U , P ⊆ U .
In healthcare systems, general idea is the transmission of medical data from patient
to another digital entity. The medical data to be transmitted can be specified either by
the user or system has default options about medical data transmission. Proposition 2
defines a system control policy for patients. In this definition, medical data can be only
obtained from a patient and it is system’s responsibility to manage medical information
of the patient.
Proposition 2. ∀pi ∈ P , system is responsible for monitoring health information of
patient pi.
The medical information gathered from patients is kept in hospital server. Medical
experts defined within the system are able to monitor those medical information under
the regulations of the hospital. In this system, we prefer to assign a set of patients
to a particular medical expert. This set of assigned patients can be reached with the
function given in Proposition 3. With this patient medical expert assignment, medical
experts are able to monitor predefined set of patients under the hospital regulations.
The information transmitted is the medical data, which is private information of the
patient.
Proposition 3. Let Pj ⊆ P be the set of patients assigned to medical expert mj ∈M .
∀pi ∈ P , ∀mj ∈M system reveals information of pi to mj if and only if p ∈ Pj
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Assignments of patients among medical experts are managed by the system admin-
istrators. This control is not given to medical experts, because in such a case, the
experts become capable of assigning all patients to themselves. Therefore, it may end
up with monitoring whole patients’ medical data. This is a potential privacy breach.
System administrators have the control of assigning and removing users for certain
roles and this assignment can be achieved for certain periods of time. Time constraint
is necessary, because a medical expert may required to be defined to system temporar-
ily. If that is the case, defining medical expert without time constraint may cause data
leakage problems. However, if the medical expert is able to connect to system for a
predefined period of time, this risk is eliminated. Administrators are also able to de-
fine mapping between medical expert and patients in order medical experts to monitor
patients’ health conditions. Proposition 4 defines the administrator capabilities.
Proposition 4. ∀ak ∈ A, ak is responsible for updating sets pj, P and M .
As mentioned before, medical experts are not able to assign patients. With the sim-
ilar idea, system administrators cannot be able to assign themselves as medical experts
at the same time. This is crucial since obtaining a medical expert role provides the
opportunity of monitoring medical information. Then the solution for this requirement
is exclusion of roles from each other. Proposition 5 illustrates the idea more formally
so that a user in medical expert set cannot be an administrator and vice versa. As a
result, the intersection of medical experts’ set (M) and set of administrators (A) yield
in an empty set. Without this control policy, system has the risk of leaking private
information of patients. However, a system administrator or a medical expert can be
patient, because patients are only be able to request their own medical information,
which is a valid request for the system.
Proposition 5. M ∩ A = ∅.
The aforementioned patient assignment is specified to many-to-one relation. A
medical expert have multiple patients defined within the system, but a patient can
be assigned only to a single medical expert. Proposition 6 introduces the idea of this
many-to-one relation from the medical expert point of view. Given two different medical
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experts defined in the system, they do not share any patient which is assigned to both
medical experts. Consequently, the sets of assigned patients (Pj) are partitions of the
patient set (P ).
Proposition 6. {Pj|mj ∈M} is a partition of P .
Medical information for a particular patient expectedly varies from time to time. In
order to specify the health condition of a patient at a given time, a function is defined in
Proposition 7. This function takes two inputs as patient and time variables. It outputs
the health condition of that patient at the given time interval. The experts are able
to get medical information of a patient with a given time with this functionality of the
system. Also patients can benefit from this function so that they can also monitor their
health condition of their own. Under normal conditions, assigned medical expert is the
only personnel who is eligible to retrieve medical information of the patient. However,
if a patient experience a condition which requires additional cautions to prevent a
dangerous outcome, the system should adapt itself according to the condition.
Proposition 7. For a given time t ∈ T , we define the function θ such that
θ(pi, t) = hi,t, where pi ∈ P and hi,t ∈ H at time t.
Patients of the system are able to generate the medical data and send the data in
a secure way to the hospital servers. The security of the data during transmission is
going to be explained in Section 4.2. From the access control point of view, medical
data of a patient can only be accessed by a single user from the patient set P which
is the owner of the medical data. Proposition 8 defines this constraint in a way that
only the owner of the medical data from the patient set is a valid user for obtaining the
access right.
Proposition 8. Let pi, pk ∈ P . pi is able to call function θ(pk, t) if and only if i = k.
Definitions and functions given up to here basically constitute the access control
model which regulates the system under normal conditions. Here normal conditions
means that the patient’s health conditions do not yield a criticality after analysis and
interpretation of the medical record. Normally, received medical information sent from
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patient is logged into hospital server and interpreted by the system in an automatic way.
If current condition of the patient requires a medical intervention, system autonomously
takes an action accordingly. In such conditions, system shift from normal conditions to
emergency conditions for particular patient. For this reason, the critical diseases are
defined within the system. After interpretation, data is analysed whether it contains
any vital information that is necessary to be responded by a medical expert. Therefore,
system initially needs a function so that it can analyse medical information and come up
with a list of possible diseases with the given medical data. Proposition 9 introduces
a function which takes health information of patient and returns the list of possible
diseases if exists. If the medical condition of the patient does not need any urgent
intervention, then function returns an empty set.
Proposition 9. Let pi ∈ P , t ∈ T and θ(pi, t) = hi,t ∈ H. Define a function f such
that f(hi,t) = Di,t ⊆ D. If pi experiences a fatal disease, then Di,t 6= ∅.
The set D consists of different diseases but each of them belongs to a certain disease
category. The disease category is an abstract group for diseases. The reason behind this
grouping mechanism is the need for the selection of medical experts to be notified when
urgent response for medical condition is required. In order to construct a generalization
for diseases, and retrieve the category of a particular disease, Proposition 10 defines a
function:
Proposition 10. ∀dk ∈ D, function γ(dk) = c implements dk belongs to the disease
category c ∈ C
With the same idea, medical experts are required to be have specialisation for certain
disease category for emergency conditions. To achieve this requirement, Proposition 11
defines a function which takes a medical expert as an input and it returns the speciality
of the medical expert. The category of a certain disease and speciality of a medical
expert is needed to be predefined within the system in order to operate normally. This
function also gives the users the opportunity to assign patients to medical experts who
are specialized with the disease category.
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Proposition 11. ∀mj ∈ M , define function η(mj) = c gives the specialisation c ∈ C
of the medical expert mj.
Once diseases are categorised and medical experts’ specializations are defined, find-
ing whether a medical expert is specialized with a certain disease or not becomes only
a function check. In Proposition 12, previously defined functions are used to make a
control check whether a medical expert is capable to treat a particular disease or not.
Proposition 12. If γ(dk) = η(mj), then mj ∈ M is said to be specialized for the
disease dk ∈ D
In case of an emergency, a subject may override the access rights of its role. The
solution is not preferred because the notion of emergency cannot be well-defined and is
open to abuse by the subjects. However, the abuse is prevented by a mapping function
that picks a subject according to the critical data of the patient under risk.
4.2 Protocols for Secure Login
In this work, before establishing a communication between hospital server and user,
both entities need to generate a secret key in order to initiate a secure link. Once
client and server establish a secure communication channel, user’s requests should be
controlled by the system whether the request is legitimate to be applied by the server
or not. In the rest of this section, the details of establishment of secure channel and
process of controlling access are described.
4.2.1 Authentication and ticket generation
Healthcare systems should possess high level of data security since they process
private medical data. To ensure the security, our protocol requires a trusted third
party, which is called Authentication and Ticket Obtainment Server (ATOS). Our login
protocol is a ticket-based one as in Kerberos [65]. Clients who would like to login to
the hospital servers, named Authorization and Data Processing Server (ADPS), should
first identify themselves to ATOS. These two servers together with clients construct the
general overview of client-server architecture which can be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: General Overview of Client-Server Architecture
Before explaining login in detail, we give the assumptions for the system.
 Client knows the correct public key of ATOS.
 ATOS has secure communication between all hospital servers (ADPSs).
 Client identifiers and client’s pin codes are kept in ATOS database in a secure
way.
Authentication and ticket generation can be seen in Figure 8. In step 1, client sends
its identity to ATOS together with a nonce in an encrypted form. This encryption
employs a public key cryptosystem such that the context is encrypted using the public
key of ATOS. This public key is to be known by the client. Nonce is a random string
which has the same length with the user’s id as they are going to be XORed to generate
the session key. The session key is the result of a hash operation which takes XOR of
client identity and the nonce value as input. In step 2, ATOS authenticates itself
to client by sending a signed version of generated key (KCS). Since client has the
public key of ATOS (KServer), the signature can be verified. In step 3, client sends
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its pin to authenticated ATOS in encrypted form to complete mutual authentication.
While sending pin, client also sends the hospital server identifier (IdADPS) which (s)he
Client ATOS ADPS
-
ﬀ
-
-
ﬀ
1. PU(KServer, Nonce‖id)
Both sides produce session key
KCS = H(Nonce
⊕
id)
2. Sign(KCS)
3. PU(KServer, id‖pin‖IdADPS)
4. E(KAA, id‖KCS)
5. E(KCS , T icketIdADPS )
T icketIdADPS = E(KATOS , OTP‖TS‖IdADPS)
Figure 8: Authentication and ticket generation protocol
would like to login. In step 4, ATOS sends the generated session key to the designated
ADPS securely. ADPS and ATOS has predefined shared secret key (KAA) to maintain
the secure channel in between. In step 5, ATOS generates and sends a ticket for
the communicating client. This ticket contains information about the identifier of the
ADPS, to which the client requested to login. The ticket is going to be checked again
by ATOS in the ticket validation phase explained in Section 4.2.2. Generated ticket is
encrypted with the session key (KCS) using symmetric encryption and sent to client.
Tickets cannot be modified by an unauthorized user since its content is encrypted by
a key (KATOS) known only to ATOS. As a result, ticket information is first encrypted
with a key which is only known by ATOS then it is again encrypted which can only be
decrypted by the client, ATOS and requested ADPS. Ticket also contains a timestamp
which is designed to hinder the replay attacks on the system.
If the client successfully completes authentication and ticket generation protocol,
generated ticket is going to be used the next phase, ticket validation.
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4.2.2 Ticket validation
In the previous subsection, we explained how a ticket has generated by ATOS in
order to control client login to the hospital server (ADPS). When the user gets encrypted
ticket, (s)he first decrypts it. As mention previously, the ticket itself is an encrypted
value which can be validated only by ATOS since it is encrypted using a key (KATOS)
known to ATOS only. This is performed in the ticket validation protocol mentioned
below.
The protocol is given in Figure 9. First two steps are summary of the authenti-
Client
ATOS
ADPS
1. Authentication Request
2. E(KCS , T icketIdADPS )
Authentication and Ticket
Generation Protocol
3. Authorization Request
id‖E(KCS, role‖Ticket)
4. E(KAA, id‖Ticket‖IdADPS) 5. E(KAA, response)
6. Authorization Response
E(KCS, response)
Figure 9: Ticket Validation
cation and ticket generation protocol explained in the previous subsection. In step 3,
client encrypts its role and ticket with the session key (KCS). Then client sends this
encrypted value together with its identifier (id) to the designated ADPS. In the previ-
ously described authentication and ticket generation protocol, ATOS sent the session
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key (KCS) of the client to ADPS. Therefore, ADPS is able to decrypt the encrypted
value sent by client. In step 4, ADPS sends an encrypted message to ATOS. This mes-
sage is the encrypted form of client identifier, client’s ticket and identity of server itself
with a key (KAA), which is shared before with ATOS. After receiving this message,
ATOS decrypts it with KAA and obtains the ticket. Then ATOS checks the validity of
the ticket by decrypting it with KATOS. If the thicket is valid, then ATOS generates
a positive login response. Otherwise, ATOS generates a negative login response. This
response is sent to ADPS in step 5 again in encrypted form. In step 6, ADPS sends
the login response to client. If the ticket is validated, ADPS checks the identity of
the client and its role within the system. Generated session key (KCS) is used for the
confidentiality and integrity of the private data. If a valid user does not send its role
during the login protocol, that client have limited access over resources. In this case,
the client is able to perform certain operations for a restricted amount of time.
4.3 Access Operations and Access Control Architecture
In this subsection, we explain the access control model and its architecture. More-
over, it is also described how access operations are performed.
4.3.1 Access request and response architecture
In an access control model, access permissions of subjects are required to be prede-
fined. As a result of this predefinition, access responses can be generated in response to
the access requests of subjects. Medical data transmission steps from ADPS to client is
shown in Figure 10. Client requests information from ADPS as the initial step. ADPS
directs this request to the Access Policy Manager (APM). APM is the entity that con-
trols the rules which are going to be applied for MAR-BAC model. The rules and other
control definitions are stored in Constraint & Control Policies Database. The requested
action is controlled whether parameters for the request are valid or not. According to
the rules, a response is given and APM forwards this response to ADPS. If the response
is positive, then ADPS queries about requested action. The action can be anything
defined in the MAR-BAC model. Depending on the access response and query result,
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an informative message is sent to client.
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Figure 10: Information Flow from ADPS to Client
The information flow is actually bidirectional; we explained ADPS to clients infor-
mation flow above. Figure 11 shows the medical information transmission from client
to ADPS. Information flow from client to ADPS again starts with a request step. Then
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1. Update Request 2. Access Request
3. Ask User Attributes4. User Attributes
5. Access Response
6. Insert Request7. Insert Response
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Figure 11: Information Flow from Client to ADPS
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ADPS forwards this request to APM as an access request. APM decides whether the
subject has the right for inserting/updating information on hospital database. Once
access is granted by APM, ADPS inserts/updates the client information database ac-
cording to the information client sends to the server. Finally an informative message is
returned to client as an update response.
4.3.2 Access Control in MAR-BAC
In this subsection, access control model for MAR-BAC, where is shown in Figure 12,
is explained. Roles (R) defined in MAR-BAC are mapped into participations (pi). Here,
the roles are more likely static groups and the participations provide the dynamicity of
the access control mechanism. The reason behind this is that access can be obtained
by the users when they participate in an act. The act set (α) is defined according to
the control policy (CP). The assignment between roles and participations are regulated
by the role-participation maps (RP ). Participations and acts are mapped with each
other within a directed graph called the activity cells (AC). The mapping defines which
participation instances are able to do predefined acts.
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AC = Set of Activity Cells
CP = Set of Control Policies
RP = Role-Participation maps
Figure 12: MAR-BAC model
RBAC model does not aware of time. It only controls access policies according to
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which role can perform which actions. Therefore, access control mechanism does not
take into account time as contextual information. In MAR-BAC model, we extend the
RBAC by assigning users to roles for a fixed amount of time. As a result, access control
policies are now able to consider context information of time while making decisions
about access permissions.
Roles should be defined in RBAC to control the access operations. However, there
may be cases such that users are defined to system but they do not have assigned to
roles. In such conditions users, who do not belong to a certain role, do not able to
perform operations. As a unique feature of our MAR-BAC model, users defined in
system without role are also able to perform operations. Since MAR-BAC model aware
of time as context information, those users can perform operations under a very strict
time constraint.
A user, who does not have any role defined as a patient, is able to send its medical
information to ADPS. Since s/he is not defined as a patient, no medical expert is
assigned to that particular user. As a result, no medical expert is able to retrieve that
users medical data under normal conditions. Such users are able to perform operations
as a patient for a given period of time. Meaning that, those users should obtain a role
in order to continue as legitimate users. The users, who do not have any role assigned,
are able to get access with the assistance of participation set defined in MAR-BAC
model.
The access request steps of MAR-BAC are summarised in Algorithm 1. At first,
user gets authenticated via login phase as explained in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2.
Once the system controls the validity of the client, server sends access request to APM.
In APM, the initial operation for access request is retrieval of the participation list
according to the role of the user. Whether client has a role or not, (s)he needs to have
a list of participations in order to request a valid action within the system. If a user
has a role, APM returns list of participations of that particular role. Otherwise it will
get the restricted operations defined in the system.
Participations consist of both functional role and validity time period of a particular
user. As it is mentioned before, users are able to perform actions within a predefined
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Algorithm 1 Access Request Steps
Require: access request Γi from user ui ∈ U and role ri ∈ R of user ui
if ui is authenticated then
pii = GetParticipations(ui, ri)
requestResponse = CheckActivityCell(Γi, pii)
if requestResponse is valid then
return access grant
else
return access reject
end if
end if
period of time for each login session. Once APM retrieves participations, it sends the
list and requested act to activity cell. Activity cell is a directed graph which maps
participations to acts. In activity cell, if requested access right has been mapped in the
corresponding act, then APM grants the access; otherwise, it rejects the access request.
Once access request is granted by APM, system performs the requested operation
and sends an informative message to user. If the access request is a medical information
transmission from patient to ADPS, then a medical analysis is performed by the system.
4.4 Medical Analysis
In this part we explain how collected medical data from the patient is interpreted
and analysed. Physiological signs play an important role in the diagnosis of diseases
because those signs assist medical experts to generate hypothesis about the illness. In
MAR-BAC, we utilise the interpretation of some of the primal vital signs and ECG
signal retrieved from patient.
Our system is initiated whenever medical data is retrieved from the patient. Once
the data of the patient has been securely received by the hospital server (ADPS), the
data is first stored in a secure database. Then the data is sent to the medical data
interpreter subsystem. In the medical data interpreter, the primal vital signs (body
temperature, blood pressure, respiration, oxygen saturation and pulse) and ECG signal
are analysed and interpreted.
Most of the biological activities are directly affected by the body temperature.
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Therefore, interpreter initially checks for the body temperature of the patient. Tem-
perature higher than 37.5 °C is considered as high. Since those values may critically
malfunction the body activity. Therefore, patient needs immediate responses in order
to recover its health. Similarly temperatures lower than 36.0 °C is interpreted as low
body temperature in our model. Values between 37.5 °C and 36.0 °C is optimal value
for body temperature.
Another determinant factor for the health condition is the blood pressure. It consists
of two different types; diastolic and systolic. As the second phase of interpretation,
patient’s blood pressure is observed by the system. If the blood pressure is below 90
mmHg for systolic or below 60 mmHg for diastolic, then the interpretation result is low
for the patient. If systolic value is higher than 150 mmHg or diastolic value is higher
than 95 mmHg, then the result is high blood pressure.
The next phase of the interpretation is inspection of respiration. It is another
significant factor due to breathing is a requisite for human life and respiration disorders
could harm the body. If the system finds out that the patient’s respiration frequency is
more than 26 per minute, then system interprets the result as high respiration frequency.
Respiration rate below 14 breathes per minute is interpreted as low. With low rate,
patient’s health condition can be severely damaged since the body lacks energy. Values
between 14 and 26 per minute are considered as normal values for respiration frequency.
In addition to respiration frequency, it is also significant how much oxygen is sat-
urated by blood cells, as it is another significant factor of energy generation. Thus,
oxygen saturation is another parameter to be checked by the system. Oxygen satura-
tion is not sufficient if it is below 90%. Otherwise it is interpreted as normal.
As a last primal vital sign, pulse is analysed by the system. It is another important
characteristic that medical experts check under emergency conditions. It directly affects
health condition because heart beat is one of the vital operation that human body has
to continue for survival. Upper bound for heart beat rate is 100 beats per minute.
Lower bound for the frequency of the pulse is 60 beats per minute.
All of the primal vital signs have the potential of pointing a critical disease which
requires timely actions by the medical experts. Although primal vital signs are ini-
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tial parameters to be examined, in this work electrocardiogram (ECG) information is
also checked in order to make more precise decisions about diseases. Interpretation of
ECG requires a bit more resource than primal vital signs. ECG is rather big data as
compared to other vital signs because it is sent as a signal from the patient. ECG
interpretation starts with the pinpoint operation of important waves within the signal.
Those important waves are called P, Q, R, S and T waves. Heart rate information is
extracted from the R waves. Consecutive R peaks are used to calculate the pulse rate.
This rate is the input for the pulse interpretation. Since all waves are found as an initial
step, the next operation is to determine important wave intervals. Amplitude of T wave
is found by finding the mean value of the signal. Then respectively QT, QRS and PR
intervals are extracted from the data [66]. At the end, those intervals and amplitudes
are checked with a similar control done in primal vital sign interpretation; predefined
thresholds for those amplitude and intervals determine the result of the interpretation.
Figure 13 illustrates a real ECG sample with pinned waves by the system. The program
is also able to extract the heart rate as it is specified in dialogbox of the figure.
Figure 13: ECG signal and pinned waves
Consequently, under the light of the interpretation results, medical data is used to
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identify whether the patient is experiencing a medical anomaly which requires immedi-
ate action to be taken or not. The detailed explanation for the identification medical
anomaly is given in Section 4.5.
4.5 Critical State
Once the interpretations explained in Section 4.4 are completed, the results are ex-
amined automatically to determine potential emergency conditions. Such conditions
are predefined in our model to represent a proof-of-concept. Of course, such an au-
tomatic mechanism may not give precise and accurate information about the disease.
However, such a mechanism results in automated selection of the corresponding medical
experts to be evoked for further examinations, tests and treatment. This is our aim in
our system.
Each critical disease defined in our MAR-BAC model has certain combination of
disease characteristics. Diseases defined in MAR-BAC are given in Table 2. In this ta-
ble, disease name, disease characteristics and corresponding disease category are listed.
If a medical data yields in any combination of disease characteristics, system automati-
cally changes the patient’s condition from normal to emergency. For example, consider
the following scenario in which patient pi ∈ P is suffering from Hypokalemia at time
t ∈ T . Medical data is shown as hi,t ∈ H. As mentioned in Proposition 9, function
f(hit) results in set of diseases at the end of medical data interpretation. Thus, def-
inition of the disease is f(hit) = Di,t. Then disease Hypokalemia is going to be in
this resulting set (dh ∈ Di,t). This disease belongs to the “Internal Medicine” disease
category. Therefore, the function γ(dh) = ca gives the corresponding disease category.
Based on the category of disease, online medical experts who are specialised with the
category ca are found as the next step. If medical expert mj is specialised in category
ca, then the function η finds mj as a specialised medical expert in disease category.
This operation is defined in Proposition 12 as if η(mj) = γ(dh) then mj is assumed to
be more knowledgeable to cure critical disease dh.
In the scenario exemplified above, medical experts with internal medicine special-
ization are selected. The selection also takes into account whether those experts are
43
online and authenticated or not. A given number of specialised and online medical
experts are selected as medical experts to be alarmed. The number of medical experts
to be notified is a system parameter. Chosen experts are notified by the system.
Algorithm 2 outlines the process of analysis and system response to criticality. In our
proof of concept implementation, medical experts are notified via desktop computers;
but in real life implementations this notification can be done through mobile devices.
Additionally, the selected medical experts are able to monitor the changes of the patient
until the patient recovers from its current emergency condition. After the patient
returns to his normal condition, extra privileges given to those medical experts are
revoked by the system. The privilege management according to the current condition
of the patient shows the proactivity of our MAR-BAC model.
Algorithm 2 Critical State Response
Require: n: number of medical experts to be notified, pi ∈ P , t ∈ T
hi,t = θ(pi, t)
Dit = f(hi,t)
for each dk ∈ Dit do
c = γ(dk)
doctorsToBeAlarmed = FindOnlineDoctorsWithSpeciality(c, n)
for each mj ∈ doctorsToBeAlarmed do
NotifyDoctor(mj, hi,t)
if pi /∈ Pj then
GrantExtraPrivilege(mj, pi)
end if
end for
end for
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Table 2: List of critical diseases
Disease Name Disease Characteristics Disease Category
 Rapid respirations
Acidosis  High pulse Internal Medicine
 Low blood pressure
 Rapid respirations
Cardiac Tamponade  Low pulse Cardiology
 Low blood pressure
 Low respirations
Coronary Thrombosis  Low oxygen saturation Cardiology
 High blood pressure
 High blood pressure
Hypercalcemia  ECG Internal Medicine
- Shortened QT interval
 Low pulse
 ECG
Hyperkalemia - Tall T wave Internal Medicine
- Shortened QT interval
- Wide QRS interval
- Prolonged PR interval
 Rapid respirations
Hypoglycemia  Rapid pulse Internal Medicine
 Low blood pressure
 Low respirations
Hypotherma  Low pulse Internal Medicine
 Low blood pressure
 Rapid respirations
Hypoxia  Rapid pulse Pulmonology
 High blood pressure
 Low oxygen saturations
 Low respirations
 High blood pressure
 Dysrythmias
Hypokalemia  ECG Internal Medicine
- Low amplitude T wave
- Prolonged QT interval
 Rapid respirations
Pulmonary Embolism  Rapid pulse Pulmonology
 Low oxygen saturation
 Low blood pressure
 Low respirations
Tension Pneumothorax  Low oxygen saturation Pulmonology
 Low blood pressure
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5 Performance Evaluation
We have implemented our proposed MAR-BAC model using C# programming lan-
guage in order to carry out a simulation-based performance evaluation. Some of the
health information, such as body temperature, respiration, oxygen saturation and blood
pressure have been randomly generated and used. These are also known as primal vital
signs of fatal diseases. We obtained real Electrocardiogram (ECG) data for 50 different
patients from the publicly available PhysioBank MIMIC II Waveform database [67].
ECG signals are interpreted using MATLAB. The interpretation of ECG also extracts
the pulse rate of heart which is another vital sign. We have simulated the hospital en-
vironment in a local computer, which has Windows 7 64-bit OS, i7-2600 CPU with 3.40
GHz frequency and 8 GB RAM. User environment is simulated with the help of another
computer which has Windows 7 64-bit OS, i5-3230M CPU with 2.60 GHz frequency
and 4GB RAM.
5.1 Performance Metrics and Parameters
The performance analysis of our MAR-BAC model consists of two main parts; server
processing delay and end-to-end delay. Server processing delay is the delay due to the
operations performed at the server side and consists of three parts (i) ECG interpre-
tation delay, (ii) database operations delay and (iii) security and access control delay.
The ECG interpretation part is the one explained in Section 4.4. Interpretation of
ECG signal is done by first finding QRS complex intervals from the signal. Afterwards,
interval changes and other medical data are statically analysed and interpreted by the
system. Database operations are insert/update and query operations. Security delay
is the time to perform security operations on the medical data. The security opera-
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tions are symmetric encryption/decryption for confidentiality and computation of hash
based message authentication code (HMAC) for the message integrity. Access control
delay is the time to perform access related processing and server operations which are
used to maintain the server. In case of medical analysis, server preparation of medical
data and after analysis, server actions to respond clients accordingly are also covered
in access control delay. End-to-end delay is total time needed for the entire processing,
data transmission and receiving acknowledgements. These time related metrics are im-
portant since in a healthcare system, we need fast responses in order to manage critical
states. Moreover, the bottleneck of analysis is the interpretation of ECG signal. Thus
we also measure it separately.
System parameters defined in our system are: (i) number of on-line patients, (ii)
medical data analysis request interval per user and (iii) physical location of clients.
All three parameters determine the system load. Medical data analysis request inter-
val per user is modelled using exponential distribution [68] with average request rate
parametrised as λ. Exponential distribution is used since the ECG analyses create a
queue at the server side and in the queuing systems interarrival times are generally
modelled with exponential distribution. Since almost the entire duration of medical
data interpretation is utilised for ECG analysis, in the rest of this thesis, we will re-
fer to medical data interpretation and ECG analysis/interpretation interchangeably for
performance point of view. The raise in number of patients also increases the amount of
medical information sent to the hospital server. Access requests to medical data, which
are sent by medical experts, also generate system load. Whenever a patient sends its
medical data to the system, the record is queued by the system for medical analysis.
Medical analysis subsystem dequeues medical data one by one from the head of the
queue and analyses each them. The physical location of the clients is categorised as
local and remote. A local client is the one who connects to the hospital server from the
same network. A remote client is connected to hospital server from a different network.
The most memory consuming medical data is ECG. Although all ECG data is taken
as 5 minute measurement, there are variations in data length of ECG signals. A set of
ECG signal may take as much as 1 MByte. As it is mentioned before, ECG requires a
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Figure 14: ECG interpretation Delay
special interpretation and processing. Figure 14 shows time variations of ECG signal
processing and interpretation among 50 patients. As can be seen in this figure, ECG
signal interpretation delay varies between 1200 and 1700 msec and is independent of the
length of the sample. Thus, it changes from patient to patient due to the characteristics
within the ECG signal.
5.2 Simulation Results
Simulation results of our MAR-BAC system are explained in this subsection. In all
of the analyses, we scaled the number of patients from 100 to 500. Each ECG data has
its own characteristics which changes time required to complete interpretation. Thus,
there is a jitter here. In order to model the queue of ECG interpretation at the server
side, we use various average ECG signal interpretation request rate (λ) values. Finally,
we performed tests for patients in local and remote networks.
5.2.1 Analysis of Secure Login protocol
This subsection gives the timings of login protocol, which was explained in Sec-
tion 4.2. The analysis is performed for local and remote users. In the Table 3, the
results are given. Time to perform mutual authentication, ticket generation and ticket
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validation is 100 ms per user in a local area network and 214 ms per user connected
remotely. Since this is performed only once per session, this delay is not so significant
in overall performance.
Table 3: Simulation result for login protocol proposed in Section 4.2
Local User Remote User
Authentication, login and
ticket validation delay
100 ms 217 ms
5.2.2 Scalability analysis of local patients
In this subsection, the simulation is performed in a local area network. In the first
set of tests, we set the λ value to 0.0001 requests/(sec ∗ user). Figure 15 gives the
simulation results. As shown in the figure, server side operations are between 2 and 2.5
seconds and end-to-end delay is between 5 and 6 seconds. The increase in number of
patients does not significantly affect the timings. The reason behind this behaviour is
low request rate and consequently no waiting time in the queues for medical analysis.
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Figure 15: Simulation results with local patients, λ = 0.0001 requests/(sec ∗ user)
The performance results of Figure 15 are also shown in Table 4 in tabular format.
Moreover, the percentages of delay components are also shown in this table. As ob-
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served from this table, more than half of the total delay is due to the network delay.
Interpretation and analysis of medical data nearly takes quarter of the whole delay. Se-
curity related and access control operations take less than 4% of the total delay. Thus
we conclude that security and access control bring only a negligible overhead in this
setting. Moreover, interpretation is not dependent on server load because request rate
is low in this simulation setup.
Table 4: Simulation result with local patient execution timing and percentages;
λ = 0.0001 requests/(sec ∗ user).
Number of Patients
100 200 300 400 500
ms % ms % ms % ms % ms %
Interpretation
delay
1389.4 27.00 1410.0 27.31 1523.1 27.72 1419.5 25.23 1401.7 23.89
Database oper-
ations delay
717.9 13.96 557.1 10.79 609.2 11.09 599.4 10.66 603.8 10.29
Security and
Access Control
delay
163.6 3.17 165.6 3.20 171.6 3.13 176.8 3.14 181.2 3.08
Network delay 2874.6 55.87 3029.9 58.68 3189.7 58.06 3429.1 60.97 3680.2 62.72
Total delay 5145.5 100 5162.6 100 5493.6 100 5624.8 100 5866.9 100
Second set of tests is performed with a moderate ECG request rate, λ = 0.001
requests/(sec ∗ user). Figure 16 shows the increase in interpretation time of medical
data with increased number of patients. Server side delay is measured between 2 and 8
seconds and end-to-end delay is between 6 and 12 seconds. The reason of this increase
is the queuing effect. The load of the system creates to a queue of access requests at the
hospital server (ADPS) and the waiting time in this queue causes the increased delay.
The performance results of Figure 16 are also shown in Table 5 in tabular format. As
compared to the previous setting, time for interpretation has increased from quarter of
the total delay to more than half of it for larger number of patients. The time required
to perform database operations and security and access control delay do not change
significantly with different number of patients. In this setting, the share of security and
access control delay is less 3% of the total delay. Another increased delay component
of this setting is the network delay. This is due to the fact that increase in λ causes
more medical data to be transmitted and more network level interrupts at the server
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Figure 16: Simulation results with local patients, λ = 0.001 requests/(sec ∗ user)
Table 5: Simulation result with local patient execution timing and percentages;
λ = 0.001 requests/(sec ∗ user).
Number of Patients
100 200 300 400 500
ms % ms % ms % ms % ms %
Interpretation
delay
1531.8 26.21 1829.7 29.97 3820.7 47.58 5130.2 50.94 6573.1 56.35
Database oper-
ations delay
587.7 10.05 583.9 9.57 591.6 7.37 624.9 6.20 686.0 5.88
Security and
Access Control
delay
163.3 2.79 174.1 2.85 173.7 2.16 194.7 1.95 205.7 1.76
Network delay 3562.0 60.95 3517.0 57.61 3444.6 42.89 4120.5 40.91 4200.9 36.01
Total delay 5844.8 100 6104.7 100 8030.6 100 10070.3 100 11665.7 100
side. Especially for large number of patients (400 and 500 patients), the network delay
significantly increases. However, as the interpretation delay increases faster for these
numbers of patients, the share of network delay in total delay decreases.
In final set of simulations with local patients, we set λ to 0.01 request/(secs∗user).
The results of the simulation can be seen in Figure 17. Server side delay is measured
between 30 and 58 seconds and end-to-end delay is between 35 and 65 seconds. The
main reason of these large delay values is the increased system load due to larger λ
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Figure 17: Simulation results local patients, λ = 0.01 requests/(sec ∗ user)
value. This system load especially increases interpretation and network delays.
The performance results of Figure 17 are also shown in Table 6 in tabular format.
Interpretation and medical analysis dominates the most of total delay. Other delay
components also increase in parallel with high system load. However, as the interpreta-
tion delay increase is much more significant, the shares of other delay components get
smaller in this simulation setting as compared to other ones. It is remarkable that the
share of security and access control delay is less than 1%.
Table 6: Simulation result with local patient execution timing and percentages;
λ = 0.01 requests/(sec ∗ user).
Number of Patients
100 200 300 400 500
ms % ms % ms % ms % ms %
Interpretation
delay
28142.7 80.89 31417.3 82.43 39719.4 84.23 50181.5 84.28 55181.5 85.38
Database oper-
ations delay
675.2 1.94 705.8 1.85 1099.1 2.33 1948.3 3.27 2048.3 3.17
Security and
Access Control
delay
288.7 0.83 291.4 0.76 317.7 0.67 369.5 0.62 390.5 0.60
Network delay 5685.9 16.34 5701.9 14.96 6017.6 12.77 7044.0 11.83 7014.0 10.85
Total delay 34792.5 100 38116.4 100 47153.8 100 59543.3 100 64634.3 100
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5.2.3 Scalability analysis of remote patients
In this subsection, the simulation is performed with patients in a non-local (re-
mote) network. First set of tests for remote patients are performed with λ = 0.0001
request/(sec ∗ user). Figure 18 shows the results of this simulation. The delay in
server side is between 2 and 2.5 seconds and end-to-end delay is between 10 and 10.5
seconds. As in the local user tests with the same λ value, the system load is very low
in this setting. Thus we do not observe any queuing effect as the number of patients
increase. Therefore, the delay figures do not change significantly with increased number
of patients.
The most significant outcome of the remote patient setting is that network delay
increases significantly. Here, the bottleneck is the client side due to slower connection
as compared to the server side.
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Figure 18: Simulation results remote patients, λ = 0.0001 requests/(sec ∗ user)
The performance results of Figure 18 are also shown in Table 7 in tabular format.
Network delay overwhelmingly dominates the rest of delay components of the total
delay (≈ 80% of the total delay). The database operations delay is around 5% of the
total delay. The delay caused by MAR-BAC security and access control is less than
2%, which is quite insignificant.
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Table 7: Simulation result with remote patient execution timing and percentages;
λ = 0.0001 requests/(sec ∗ user).
Number of Patients
100 200 300 400 500
ms % ms % ms % ms % ms %
Interpretation
delay
1439.9 14.02 1409.2 14.06 1466.7 14.45 1572.4 15.23 1468.7 14.09
Database oper-
ations delay
594.5 5.79 627.6 6.26 581.5 5.73 572.7 5.55 583.7 5.60
Security and
Access Control
delay
151.3 1.48 145.6 1.46 160.7 1.58 174.1 1.68 164.9 1.58
Network delay 8080.1 78.71 7839.5 78.22 7943.1 78.24 8006.6 77.54 8207.6 78.73
Total delay 10265.8 100 10022.4 100 10152.1 100 10325.8 100 10424.9 100
Second set of tests for remote clients is performed with moderate medical data
interpretation request rate, λ = 0.001 request/(secs ∗ user). Figure 19 shows the
results of this simulation. The server processing delay is between 2 and 7 seconds and
end-to-end delay is between 10 and 16.5 seconds. As the number of patients increase,
both delay values increase. The reason of this behaviour is the queuing effect with
increased system load at this λ value, as in the local user case.
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Figure 19: Simulation with remote patients given λ = 0.001 requests/(sec ∗ user)
The test results given in Figure 19 are detailed in Table 8. As can be seen there,
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network delay is the largest component of the total delay, although its percentage
reduces as the number of patients increase. This is due to increased ECG interpretation
delay with increased number of patients. Although system load increases in parallel
with the number of patients, the time required to perform security and access operations
has not been affected too much. This is because security overhead mainly relies on the
size of the data and access control delay is not affected by the size of data transmitted.
Table 8: Simulation result with remote patient execution timing and percentages;
λ = 0.001 requests/(sec ∗ user).
Number of Patients
100 200 300 400 500
ms % ms % ms % ms % ms %
Interpretation
delay
1343.0 12.43 1457.8 13.09 2912.8 23.22 5213.8 35.00 6524.7 39.69
Database oper-
ations delay
421.2 3.90 560.6 5.03 554.9 4.42 555.9 3.73 559.6 3.40
Security and
Access Control
delay
172.5 1.6 162.2 1.46 160.3 1.28 172.4 1.16 166.3 1.02
Network delay 8867.7 82.07 8959.6 80.42 8912.7 71.08 8955.7 60.11 9188.6 55.89
Total delay 10804.4 100 11140.2 100 12540 100 14897.8 100 16439.2 100
The final set of simulations for remotely connected patients is performed with the
λ = 0.01 request/(secs ∗ user). Figure 20 shows the results of this simulation. At the
server side, delay is between 17 and 50 seconds. The end-to-end delay is between 27 and
71 seconds. Since the system is heavily loaded with the λ value, ECG interpretation
and consequently server processing delay increase dramatically as compared to other
settings. Moreover, in this setting, server side processing delay becomes larger than
the network delay. Other than that, time required to analyse medical data increases as
number of clients increases due to the same queuing effect.
The test results of Figure 20 are also given in Table 9 in tabular format. The
interpretation delay started with nearly with 60% of the total delay and increased up
to around 70% as the number of patients grows. Security and access control delay is less
than 1% of the total delay, which is insignificant. Moreover, network delay increases as
the number of patients increase.
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Figure 20: Simulation with remote patients given λ = 0.01 requests/(sec ∗ user)
Table 9: Simulation result with remote patient timing and execution percentages;
λ = 0.01 requests/(sec ∗ user).
Number of Patients
100 200 300 400 500
ms % ms % ms % ms % ms %
Interpretation
delay
15979.6 59.62 28753.7 60.32 34857.1 65.17 45181.5 70.75 49181.5 69.21
Database oper-
ations delay
748.2 2.79 779.5 1.64 563.7 1.06 555.9 0.87 618.8 0.87
Security and
Access Control
delay
142.5 0.53 162.2 0.31 163.9 0.30 172.4 0.26 97.6 0.14
Network delay 9934.2 37.06 17971.9 37.70 17902 33.47 17955.7 28.12 21165.1 29.78
Total delay 26804.5 100 47667.3 100 53486.7 100 63865.5 100 71063 100
5.3 Memory Requirements Analysis
In this subsection, memory requirements of our MAR-BAC model are analysed.
MAR-BAC is an extension of RBAC model and it needs storage to operate on access
rights. Our storage requirements for MAR-BAC are grouped under 3 main categories:
(i) client, (ii) ATOS and (iii) ADPS memory requirements.
Memory requirements of one client are given in Table 10. Each client has its own
unique identifier which takes about 20 bytes of memory. Nonce and session key (KCS)
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are used for secure login protocol explained in Section 4.2. 32 bytes of storage is
required for both of those values. Role of the client also consumes memory at client
side which is about 20 bytes. Because of each client connects to ATOS and ADPS, 2
different sockets are needed and each socket consumes 94 KBytes of memory. Another
important memory consuming entity is the RSA public key of ATOS. We choose public
key as 2048-bit; thus, memory requirement of ATOS public key is about 500 bytes
because of the key structure used. In total, a client requires approximately 189 Kbytes
of memory.
Table 10: Memory requirement of one client
Memory
Client id ≈20 Bytes
Client-ADPS session key (KCS) 32 Bytes
Client nonce 32 Bytes
Client role ≈20 Bytes
Socket for ATOS communication 94 KBytes
Socket for ADPS communication 94 KBytes
Public Key of ATOS ≈500 Bytes
ATOS unit memory requirements are given in Table 11. ATOS keeps its RSA
public-private key pair which takes 2 KBytes of storage. ATOS also keeps session keys
between different hospital servers (ADPS) which is 32 bytes per server. Since ATOS is
responsible for authentication of clients, it keeps id, pin, OTP, nonce and session keys of
each client. In total, those values requires approximately 109 bytes of memory for each
client connected to ATOS. ATOS also keeps sockets for each client for communication
operations, which takes 94 KBytes of memory.
To sum up, Equation 1 gives the total memory required by ATOS.
MATOS = 2 + ((nadps × 32)× 10−3)
+ ((nc × 109)× 10−3) + (nc × 94) KBytes
(1)
where, nadps is the number of ADPS servers connected to ATOS and nc is the number
of clients who are connected to ATOS.
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Table 11: Memory Requirement of ATOS (unit values)
Memory
RSA public-private key pair 2 KBytes
ATOS-ADPS session key (KAA) 32 Bytes per ADPS server
Client id ≈20 Bytes per client
Client pin ≈10 Bytes per client
Client OTP ≈15 Bytes per client
Client nonce 32 Bytes per client
Client-ADPS session key (KCS) 32 Bytes per client
Client Socket 94 KBytes per client
ADPS unit memory requirements are given in Table 12. ADPS securely communi-
cates with ATOS using a session key (KAA), which is 32 bytes. There is also a socket
for this communication at ADPS side which uses 94 KBytes of memory. For each
client, ADPS needs to keep track of client id, session key (KCS), role, and socket infor-
mation which require about 95 KBytes of memory. As it is stated in Section 4.3, we
designed the Access Policy Manager (APM) for regulating access control operations.
In APM, role-participation mappings and activity cell mappings, which are basically
participation-act mappings, require 40 bytes for each mapping. Because of MAR-BAC
is capable of interpreting and analysing the medical data, ADPS keeps a disease list
and a symptom-disease mapping whether a patient is suffering from a medical emer-
gency. 40 bytes needed for keeping each disease information and each symptom-disease
mapping requires around 2 KBytes of memory.
Total memory requirement of ADPS is calculated in Equation 2.
MADPS = (32× 10−3) + 94
+ ((nc × 102)× 10−3) + (nc × 94)
+ ((nr × 30)× 10−3) + ((nr,p × 40)× 10−3) + ((nac × 40)× 10−3)
+ ((nd × 40)× 10−3) + (nd × 2) KBytes
(2)
where, nr is the number of roles, nr,p is the number of role-participation mappings,
nac is the number of activity cells, nd is the number of diseases and nc is the number
of clients connected to ADPS.
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Table 12: Memory Requirement of ADPS (unit values)
Memory
ATOS session key (KAA) 32 Bytes
Socket for ATOS communication 94 KBytes
Client id ≈20 Bytes per client
Client-ADPS session key (KCS) 32 Bytes per client
Client role ≈20 Bytes per client
Client Socket 94 KBytes per client
Role List ≈30 Bytes per role
Role-Participation mapping 40 Bytes per mapping
Activity Cell 40 Bytes per mapping
Disease List 40 Bytes per disease
Symptom-Disease mapping 2 KBytes per mapping
In our simulations, we used MATLAB for ECG interpretation. The MATLAB
object, which is defined at ADPS side, consumes 154 MBytes of memory in order to
operate ECG interpretation. We have also used ECG samples which approximately
consume 1MByte of memory per sample. These samples use memory at both client
side and ADPS side because of the assumption of client is generating the medical data
and sends it to ADPS.
5.4 Comparative Analysis with the Related Work
In this part, some related work in the literature are explained and compared with
MAR-BAC model.
Muppavarapu et al. [1] aim to reduce the administration overhead by dividing work
to different sections of the access control model. To achieve this division of operations,
they designed an access control model which retrieves capabilities of a user from an
entity called Shibboleth. In order to operate over certain resources, user should get
its capabilities from Shibboleth and asks for access permission to a resource manager.
In Figure 21, architecture of access control model of Shibboleth is given. In [1], all
user-role assignments are controlled by Shibboleth which is considered to be secure.
However, it is not clearly shown that the security of the messages is maintained during
transmission of access request and access response. In other words, confidentiality or
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Figure 21: Shibboleth architecture in work [1]
integrity of the messages are not well defined in this system. Even the communication
is safeguarded with a secure channel, security of the access is not clearly defined. We
overcome those problems in MAR-BAC model since confidentiality and integrity of
the messages transmitted are safeguarded with the establishment of secure channel as
explained in Section 4.2. Another drawback for [1] is the requirement of receiving a
ticket-like access permission for each distinct request. They claimed that the clients
are able to receive a single ticket which permits them to operate all valid operations
within the system. This is the same as receiving capabilities which was described in
Section 2.1.1. However, receiving capabilities, in order to access certain objects, is
vulnerable to forgery which causes problems such as modification of capabilities by the
user. If those capabilities of a user can be modified, then user can access resources
which are not open for that particular user. The problem of revocation of clients after
receiving access capabilities from Shibboleth and problem of cloning those capabilities
are also not addressed in [1]. In MAR-BAC, access permissions are directly controlled by
APM. Therefore users are able to request access for certain operations. APM contains
the information about access rights, which means predefined operations which can be
permitted to users in APM. As a result, the problems of cloning and revocation of
capabilities do not interfere with regular access control operations regulated by MAR-
BAC.
The security overhead reported in [1] is limited to a single command and is 270 ms.
Even this incomplete timing value is greater than our MAR-BAC’s worst case secure
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login protocol execution time, which is 220 ms. Thus, we conclude that our MAR-BAC
outperforms the work proposed in [1].
Another inspiring study is done by Venkatasubramanian [2]. This work utilises
information gathering and transmission of it by applying security mechanisms in order
to protect the data. The data taken from patients are sent to a hospital server. In the
server, there exists a continuous control mechanism which scans for the patient’s health
information in certain periods of time. If the system finds an anomaly about a patient,
it automatically takes a responsive action. Table 13 gives the timing results which are
taken from the implementation of [2]. Physiological signals and their timing results of
performing some computations and corresponding current information are included in
this table. In order to apply a secure model, patients’ physiological signal features are
extracted and used for secret key computations. Those features, called as chaff points,
assist to apply fuzzy vault [69] based cryptography. However, generation of such keys
requires more than 15 seconds at both sender and receiver sides. In our model, security
overhead is always less then 0.5 second. This means the work in [2] is at least 30 times
slower than our MAR-BAC model from security overhead point of view.
Table 13: Timing results from Venkatasubramanian work [2]
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6 Conclusions
In this thesis, we designed a Medically Adaptive Role Based Access Control (MAR-
BAC) model for healthcare systems. In our model, we extended classical RBAC by
adding dynamicity with proactively change of access definitions. While doing such
modifications, care has been taken not to violate the privacy of the content defined
in the system. Our work is capable to transmit medical information over a public
channel. We have designed a protocol in order to establish a secure channel. Another
plus for our system is the ability of interpreting and analysing the medical data. In this
way, the system finds out emergency conditions of the patients. Medical anomalies,
which are interpreted as dangerous for the patient health, are notified to doctors in an
automated way. It has been defined by which access control policies are applied in the
system. Additionally, users are able to request actions which are valid in different roles.
This increases the dynamicity of the system. By applying such a mechanism, private
information disclosure and unauthorised accesses are avoided.
We implemented MAR-BAC model and performed simulation based performance
analysis. The medical data generated from a single patient does not actually change
immensely before 45 minutes. However, in our simulations we used smaller medical data
generation intervals to test the limits of MAR-BAC. Even in such a case, end-to-end
delay for a patient to be responded in case of an emergency is at most around a minute
and scales linearly with respect to the number of patients. Most of this time is spent
for medical data interpretation and transmission; the overhead of security is less than
1%, which is not so significant. We also compared our MAR-BAC model’s security
overhead with related work and showed that our security overhead is much smaller.
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